


# $^{238}\text{Pu}$ Anion Exchange Column Safety during Flow Interruptions



**SRNL**<sup>TM</sup>  
SAVANNAH RIVER NATIONAL LABORATORY

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# Outline

- Historical Context
- Theory
- Controls
- Modeled System & Assumptions
- Calculated Results
- Incident at Mayak Russian
- Conclusions

# Historical Context

- Hazards recognized in 1950's by DuPont
- At least 7 accidents in Literature 1962-68
- Lead to controls on temperature, acid, flow interruption time, resins used and venting
- Early tests on effects of radiation damage on capacity
- Dried Resins recognized as risk

- Resin bed has low Heat Capacity and thermal conductivity resulting in near adiabatic column center
- Liquid Flow removes heat generated by radioactive decay and chemical reaction
- No flow condition allows heat to accumulate in bed and temperature to rise
- Reaction rate exponential function of temperature

# Theory (continued)

## “Well Vented” Column

- T limited by solution boiling pt (100-120 °C)
- T rises until evaporative cooling removes heat generated
- Sufficient venting necessary to remove all gaseous reaction products and evaporation
- Insufficient venting will allow pressure rise resulting in temperature increase and runaway reaction

10<sup>8</sup> rad Dose to resin

Max 60 °C - operated ambient

15 min flow interruption

9 M HNO<sub>3</sub> Max


Thermal testing of resins

“Ever Open” Vents on columns

“Ever Wet” resin bed

# Modeled System

$$\begin{aligned} Q_{\text{total}} &= Q_{\text{radiolytic}} + Q_{\text{rxn}} - Q_{\text{Heat Transfer}} \\ &= \rho_{\text{resin-bed}} C_p \Delta T \\ &= (\rho_{\text{dry-resin}} C_p \text{dry-resin} + \rho_{\text{solution}} C_p \text{solution}) \Delta T \\ Q_{\text{rxn}} &= Q_0 \exp(E_a/RT) \end{aligned}$$



# Assumptions

- 800 g  $^{238}\text{Pu}$  (100% isotopic)
- 85L resin with 42L of 8M  $\text{HNO}_3$  above resin bed
- 45 g/L max Pu resin loading
- Pu loaded on upper resin bed only
- No mixing of resin/liquid within resin bed (below boiling pt)
- 50 °C initial column temperature
- No axial heat transfer
- Agitator in resin bed OSS (out of service)

# Resin Testing

- Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARC) data on MSA-1/Dowex 21K
  - T,P profiles high phi test cell
  - Used to establish kinetic parameters on reaction rates
  - Temperature, Pressure rates (also venting requirements)
- RSST/ARSST/VSP2 data on Reillex HPQ™
  - T,P profiles low phi test cell
  - Used to determine venting requirements and size pressure relief devices
  - Screening to compare reactivity various resins/treatments

# “Well-Vented” Column Assumption

- Calculation to test assumption of adequate venting
  - Test cell for ARC/ARRST is sealed
  - Calculated moles of gas as  $f(t)$  from  $P(t), T(t)$  data
  - $n(t) = n_0 (1/P \delta P/\delta t - 1/T \delta T/\delta t)$ , assuming  $Z=1$
  - Heat source 800 g  $^{238}\text{Pu}$
  - Assume chemical reaction energy @90 °C = radiolytic decay heat and doubles for each 10 °C rise
  - Estimate offgas rate from column at various temperatures from both reaction gases and evaporation
- Offgas rate rises from 46 L/min to 472 L/min as T increases from 90 °C to 130 °C
- Existing 3” vent estimated @ ~500 L/min with ~0.01” w.c.  $\Delta P$


# “Well-Vented” Column Assumption

T,C	Reaction	Evaporation	Total	
	L/min	L/min	L/min	kg /hr
91	5	41	46	1
101	9	64	73	2
111	19	109	128	4
121	40	202	242	7
130	82	390	472	13

# Measured Parameters

- $E_a/R=12771 \text{ /K}$
- $Q_0=3.35e-12 \text{ J/s/cc}$
- $\Delta H_{\text{rxn}}= 619 \text{ J/g}$
- $\rho_{\text{resin-bed}}= 1.2 \text{ g/cc}$
- $C_{p \text{ resin-bed}}=0.71 \text{ cal/cc/K}$
- $0.56 \text{ watts/g } ^{238}\text{Pu}$

# Calculated T(t) Profile



# Mayak Incident

When: 7/17/93 14:15 Moscow Time

Where: Mayak Isotope Production Plant in Russia

What: Anion Column SN-04 with 374 g  $^{238}\text{Pu}$ ,

Loaded on sorbent VP-1AP (2,5-methyl vinylpyridine divinyl benzene copolymer)

Washed with 7M  $\text{HNO}_3$ , then allowed to stand with no-flow for 3 hours

Overpressurization, Vessel Rupture, resin ejected into cell, etc

Why:

Cooling Jacket? (incapable of removing all heat generated)

Valve Leakage? (possible loss of liquid on top of resin bed)

Increased batch size

Utilization of same tank for make-up of wash and elution acid (process delay)

Hazards not sufficiently analyzed

# Conclusions

- Wet  $^{238}\text{Pu}$  column will heat up over an ~2 hour flow interruption
- “Well-Vented” Wet  $^{238}\text{Pu}$  column would be expected to heat up and evaporate to dryness over a 4-10 hour period
- These calculations compare well with accident at Mayak
- Traditional 15 min flow interruption operating limit was shown to be adequate